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Abstract 
 
Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm’s-length, 
spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the 
context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments, using a 
comprehensive sample of U.S. based VCs over the period 1980 to 2003. VC funds whose parent firms 
enjoy more influential network positions have significantly better performance, as measured by the 
proportion of portfolio company investments that are successfully exited through an initial public offering 
or a sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better networked VC firms are 
significantly more likely to survive to subsequent rounds of financing and to eventual exit. The magnitude 
of these effects is economically large, and is robust to a wide range of specifications. Our models suggest 
that the benefits of being associated with a well-connected VC are more pronounced in later funding 
rounds. Once we control for network effects in our models of fund and portfolio company performance, the 
importance of how much investment experience a VC has is reduced, and in some specifications, 
eliminated.  
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Networks are widespread in many financial markets. Bulge-bracket investment banks, for instance, have 
strong relationships with institutional investors which they make use of when pricing and distributing 
corporate securities (Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001)). In the corporate loan 
market, banks often prefer syndicating loans with other banks over being the sole lender. Similarly, in the 
primary equity and bond markets, banks tend to co-underwrite securities offerings with banks they have 
long-standing relationships with (Corwin and Schultz (2004)). 
In the same spirit, networks feature prominently in the venture capital industry. VCs tend to syndicate 
their investments with other VCs, rather than investing alone (Lerner (1994a)). They are thus bound by 
their current and past investments into webs of relationships with other VCs. Once they have invested in a 
company, VCs draw on their networks of service providers – head hunters, patent lawyers, investment 
bankers etc. – to help the company succeed (Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Sahlman (1990)). Indeed, one 
prominent VC goes as far as describing itself as a venture keiretsu (Lindsey (2003), Hsu (2004)). The 
capital VCs invest in promising new ventures comes from a small set of institutional and other investors 
with whom they tend to have long-established relationships. In all these instances, many VCs show a 
preference for networks rather than arm’s-length, spot-market transactions. 
While the prevalence of networking in many financial markets has been documented in the literature, 
the performance consequences of this organizational choice remain unknown. In the venture capital 
market, for instance, some VCs presumably have better-quality relationships and hence enjoy more 
powerful network positions than others, implying differences in their clout, opportunity sets, access to 
information, etc. In this study, we ask whether these differences help explain the cross-section of VC 
investment performance.  
We focus on the co-investment networks that VC syndication gives rise to, and leave the other two 
main networks VCs use (involving service providers and institutional investors in their funds) to future 
research. Syndication relationships are a natural starting point, not only because they are easy to observe, 
but also because there are good reasons to believe they are vital to a VC’s performance. The two main 
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drivers of a VC’s performance are the ability to source high-quality deal flow (i.e., the ability to select 
promising companies), and the ability to nurture its investments (i.e., the ability to add value to portfolio 
companies). Syndication likely affects both of these performance drivers.  
There are at least three reasons to expect syndication networks to improve the quality of deal flow. 
First, VCs invite others to co-invest in their promising deals in the expectation that such invitations will 
be reciprocated in the future (Lerner (1994a)). Second, by checking each other’s willingness to invest in 
potentially promising deals, VCs can pool correlated signals and thereby may select better investments in 
situations of often extreme uncertainty about the viability and return potential of investment proposals 
(Wilson (1968), Sah and Stiglitz (1986)). Third, individual VCs tend to have investment expertise that is 
both sector-specific and location-specific. Syndication helps diffuse information across sector boundaries 
and expands the spatial radius of exchange, thus allowing VCs to diversify their portfolios (Stuart and 
Sorensen (2001)).  
In addition to improving deal flow, syndication networks may also help VCs add value to their 
portfolio companies.1 Syndication networks facilitate the sharing of information, contacts, and resources 
among VCs (Bygrave (1988)), for instance by expanding the range of potential strategic alliance partners 
and launch customers for their portfolio companies. No less importantly, strong relationships with other 
VCs likely improve the chances of securing follow-on VC funding for portfolio companies, and may 
indirectly provide access to other VCs’ relationships with service providers such as head hunters and 
prestigious investment banks.  
An examination of the performance consequences of VC networks requires measures of how well 
networked a VC is. We borrow these measures from graph theory, a mathematical discipline widely used 
in economic sociology. Graph theory provides us with tools for describing networks at a “macro” level 
                                                 
1 The literature has documented a number of ways in which VCs add value to their portfolio companies, such as 
addressing weaknesses in the original business plan or the entrepreneurial team (Kaplan and Strömberg (2004)), 
professionalizing the company (Hellmann and Puri (2002)), reducing the time to product market (Hellmann and Puri 
(2000)), facilitating strategic alliances among portfolio companies (Lindsey (2003)), and ensuring strong governance 
structures at the time of the IPO (Hochberg (2004)). 
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and for measuring the relative importance, or “centrality,” of each actor in the network. In our setting, 
centrality reflects a highly favored position in the network, giving access to information, deal flow, deeper 
pools of capital, expertise, contacts, and so on. In their work on the prominence of actors in networks, 
Knoke and Burt (1983) argue that economic concepts such as access to and control over resources or 
information are well suited to measurement by network concepts such as centrality. Examples of prior 
applications of network analysis in a financial context include Robinson and Stuart (2004), who study the 
governance of strategic alliances, and Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999), who focus on the effect of 
strategic alliance networks on the performance of biotech ventures. 
In addition to measures of how well networked each VC is, we require data on the performance of VC 
investments. We examine both the performance of the VC fund and of the fund’s portfolio companies. At 
the fund level, we examine “exit rates” in the absence of publicly available data on VC fund returns. We 
define a fund’s exit rate as the fraction of its portfolio companies that are successfully exited via an IPO 
or a sale to another company. At the portfolio company level, we examine not only whether or not the 
portfolio company achieved a successful exit, but also intermediate performance, namely whether the 
portfolio company survived to obtain an additional round of funding.  
Controlling for other known determinants of VC fund performance such as fund size (Kaplan and 
Schoar (2004)) as well as the competitive funding environment and the investment opportunities facing 
the VC (Gompers and Lerner (2000)), we find that VCs that are better networked at the time a fund is 
raised subsequently enjoy significantly better fund performance, as measured by the rate of successful 
portfolio exits over the next ten years. The economic magnitude of this effect is meaningful: Depending 
on the specification, a one-standard-deviation increase in network centrality increases exit rates by around 
two percentage points from the 34.2% sample average. Using limited data on fund IRRs disclosed 
following recent Freedom of Information Act lawsuits, we estimate that this is roughly equivalent to a two 
percentage point increase in fund IRR from the 15% average IRR.  
When we examine performance at the portfolio company level, we find that a VC’s network centrality 
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has a positive and significant effect on the probability that a portfolio company survives to a subsequent 
funding round or exits successfully. Again, the effect is large economically. For instance, the survival 
probability in the first funding round increases from the unconditional expectation of 66.8% to 72.4% for 
a one-standard-deviation increase in the lead VC’s network centrality. Interestingly, the effect increases 
over the course of subsequent funding rounds, suggesting that the importance of VC networking is greater 
in the later stages of company development. 
Perhaps the leading alternative explanation for the performance-enhancing role of VC networking is 
simply experience (e.g., Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg (2003)). It seems plausible that the better-
networked VCs are also the older and more experienced VCs. To rule out that our measures of network 
centrality merely proxy for experience, our models explicitly control for a variety of dimensions of VC 
experience. Interestingly, once we control for VC networks, the beneficial effect of experience on 
performance is reduced, and in some specifications, eliminated. It is also not the case that the better-
networked VCs are simply the ones with better past performance records: While we do find evidence of 
persistence in performance from one fund to the next, our measures of network centrality continue to have 
a positive and significant effect on fund exit rates when we control for persistence.  
The way we construct the centrality measures makes it unlikely that our results are driven simply by 
reverse causality (that is, the argument that superior performance enables VCs to improve their network 
positions, rather than the other way around). For a fund of a given vintage year, measures of network 
centrality are constructed from syndication data for the five preceding years. Performance is then taken as 
the exit rate over the life of the fund, which lasts 10-12 years. Thus, we are relating a VC’s past network 
position to his future performance.  
Our main results are based on centrality measures derived from syndication networks that span all 
industries and the entire United States. To the extent that VC networks are geographically concentrated or 
industry-specific, this may underestimate a VC’s network centrality. We therefore repeat our analysis 
using industry-specific networks and a separate network of VC firms in California, the largest VC market 
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in the U.S.  Our results are not only robust to these modifications, but their economic significance 
increases substantially. In the California network, exit rates improve by approximately five percentage 
points relative to the unconditional mean of 35.7% among California VCs.  
Our contribution is fourfold. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the 
performance consequences of the VC industry’s predominant choice of organizational form: Networks. 
While previous work has examined the structure of syndication networks (Bygrave (1987, 1988), Stuart 
and Sorensen (2001)) and the motivations for the use of syndication (Lerner (1994a), Podolny (2001), 
Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002)), no previous study has examined the impact of such networks on 
VC fund and portfolio company performance. Second, our findings shed light on the industrial 
organization of the VC market. Like many financial markets, the VC market differs from the traditional 
arm’s-length spot markets of classical microeconomics. The high returns to being well-networked we 
document suggest that enhancing one’s network position should be an important strategic consideration 
for an incumbent VC, while presenting a potential barrier to entry for new VCs. Third, our findings have 
ramifications for institutional investors choosing which VC funds to invest in, as they indicate that better 
networked VCs enjoy better investment performance. Finally, our analysis provides a deeper 
understanding of the possible drivers of cross-sectional performance of VC funds, and points to the 
importance of additional fundamentals beyond those previously documented in the academic literature.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of network 
analysis techniques and discusses their implementation in the VC context. A simple example illustrating 
network analysis is presented in the Appendix. Section 2 describes our data. In Section 3, we analyze the 
effect of VC networking on fund performance. Section 4 examines the relation between networking and 
portfolio company survival. Section 5 examines the effects of industry-specific and spatially separated 
networks. Section 6 discusses our findings and concludes.  
1. Network Analysis Methodology  
The aim of network analysis is to describe the structure of networks. Network analysis focuses first 
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and foremost on the relationships that exist among a set of economic actors, and less on the individual 
actors’ characteristics (such as age, wealth, etc.). For instance, a network might be described as “dense” 
(if many actors are tied to one another via reciprocated relationships) or “sparse” (if actors tend to be 
more autarkic). It might have one dense area surrounded by a periphery of sparsely connected actors, or it 
might have several clusters of dense areas that occasionally interact with each other. The network might 
be populated by uniformly influential actors, or there may be variation in actors’ influence. And so on. 
Influence is usually measured by how “central” an actor’s network position is. An actor is considered 
central if he is extensively involved in relationships with other actors. Consider the most centralized of 
networks, the “star.” In a star-shaped network, one actor is connected to all other actors, none of whom is 
connected to anyone else. Clearly, the actor at the center of the star is the most influential: He has 
relationships with all other actors, none of whom can reach anyone else without going via the center. 
Contrast this with a ring-shaped network. In a ring, no actor is better connected than any other actor, so all 
actors are equally central. Economically, greater centrality may give a VC access to information, deal 
flow, deeper pools of capital, expertise, contacts, and so on.  
Network analysis uses a branch of mathematics called graph theory to make the concept of centrality 
more precise.2 The three most common centrality concepts are degree, closeness, and betweenness. 
Degree is based on the number of relationships or ties an actor has. The more ties, the more opportunities 
for exchange and so the more powerful the actor. Degree does not consider indirect relationships, that is, 
the possibility of reaching other actors via intermediate actors. Closeness captures the idea that an actor 
who has direct ties to many other actors has a favored position compared to an actor who must rely on 
another actor’s relationship to a third actor, in the absence of a direct relationship with the third actor. For 
instance, the center in a star is closer to all other actors than is any other actor. Betweenness is related to 
the notion of closeness. An actor who stands “between” two other actors can intermediate exchange 
between them. In a ring, each actor stands between his two immediate neighbors, who must involve him 
                                                 
2 See Wasserman and Faust (1997) for a detailed review of network analysis methods.  
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to reach one another. 
In graph theory, a network is represented by a square “adjacency” matrix, the cells of which reflect 
the ties among the actors in the network. The example described in the Appendix shows how the various 
centrality measures outlined below are computed. In our setting, we code two VCs syndicating investment 
in the same portfolio company as having a tie.3 Depending on the way ties are coded, adjacency matrices 
can be directed or undirected. Directed matrices differentiate between ties that were originated by actor i 
versus those originated by actor j, while undirected matrices make no such distinction. In our setting, the 
undirected adjacency matrix records as a tie any participation by both VC firm i and VC firm j in a 
syndicate. The directed adjacency matrix differentiates between syndicates led by VC i versus those led 
by VC j. Unlike the undirected matrix, the directed matrix does not record a tie between VCs j and k who 
were members of the same syndicate if neither led the syndicate in question.  
Networks are not static. Relationships may change, and entry to and exit from the network may 
change each actor’s centrality. We therefore construct our adjacency matrices over trailing five-year 
windows. Using these matrices, we construct the following five centrality measures. 
1.1 Degree Centrality 
VCs who have ties to many other VCs may be in an advantaged position. Since they have many ties, 
they are less dependent on any one VC for information or deal flow. In addition, they may have access to, 
and may be able to call upon, more of the resources of the network as whole. In undirected data, VCs’ 
degrees differ merely as a result of the number of ties they have. In directed data, we can distinguish 
between VCs who “receive” many ties and those who “originate” many ties. Thus, we will use three 
measures of degree centrality: 
Degree counts the number of ties each VC has, i.e., the number of unique VCs a VC has participated 
                                                 
3 As the example in the appendix illustrates, this method of coding ties produces a binary adjacency matrix. It is possible 
to construct a valued adjacency matrix accounting not only for the existence of a tie between two VCs but also for the 
number of times there is a tie between them. While the results reported in the following sections utilize the binary matrix, 
we note that all our results are robust to using network centrality measures calculated from valued matrices. 
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in a syndicate with. This ignores the direction of the ties.  
Indegree counts the number of ties a VC receives, i.e., the number of other VCs in whose syndicates 
he is invited to participate, thereby gaining access to deal flow, information, and resources he otherwise 
may not have had access to. 
Outdegree counts the number of ties a VC originates, i.e., the number of other VCs he invites into his 
own syndicates, thereby perhaps buying himself favors or future syndication opportunities in return.  
Clearly, degree centrality is a function of network size, which in our dataset varies over time due to 
entry and exit by VCs. To ensure comparability over time, we normalize each degree centrality measure 
by dividing by the maximum possible degree in an n-actor network (i.e., n–1).4 
1.2 Eigenvector Centrality (Bonacich (1972, 1987)) 
Eigenvector centrality is a measure of closeness. It measures how central actors are in terms of the 
overall structure of the network by using factor analysis to identify the dimensions of the distances among 
actors, as measured by the eigenvalues and eigenvector of the adjacency matrix. Eigenvector centrality is 
considered a particularly useful way to measure information exchange relationships, as it gives weight not 
only to ties to other actors, but also to those actors’ centrality. In essence, eigenvector centrality is a 
recursive measure of degree, whereby the centrality of an actor is defined as the sum of his ties to other 
actors, weighted by their centralities.5 In our setting, eigenvector centrality measures the extent to which a 
VC is connected to other well-connected VCs. 
1.3 Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness measures the extent to which an actor is in a favored position by falling on the shortest-
distance paths between other actors in the network. Betweenness centrality attributes power in the network 
                                                 
4 While we normalize the centrality measures used in the empirical analysis, we note that all our results are robust to 
using non-normalized network centrality measures instead. 
5 Formally, given an adjacency matrix A, the eigenvector centrality of actor i (denoted ci) is given by ci=a∑Aijcj where a is 
a parameter required to give the equations a non-trivial solution (and is therefore the reciprocal of an eigenvalue). As the 
centrality of each actor is determined by the centrality of the actors he is connected to, the centralities will be the elements 
of the principal eigenvector. The normalized eigenvector centrality is the scaled eigenvector centrality divided by the 
maximum possible value. 
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to actors on whom a large number of other actors in the network must rely to make connections within the 
network. In our setting, betweenness proxies for the extent to which a VC may act as a broker between 
other VCs. Formally, let bjk be the proportion of all paths linking actors j and k which pass through actor i. 
The betweenness of actor i is defined as the sum of all bjk where i, j, and k are distinct. Betweenness is 
therefore a measure of the number of times an actor occurs on a path. It is normalized by dividing by the 
maximum possible betweenness in an n-actor network.  
2. Sample and Data 
Data for our analysis are obtained from Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics database. Venture 
Economics began compiling data on venture capital investments in 1977, and has since backfilled the data 
to the early 1960s. Gompers and Lerner (1999b) investigate the completeness of the Venture Economics 
database and conclude that it covers more than 90% of all venture investments.  
Most venture capital funds are structured as closed-end, often ten-year, limited partnerships. They are 
not stock market traded, nor do they disclose fund valuations. The typical fund spends its first three or so 
years selecting companies to invest in, and then nurtures them over the next few years (Ljungqvist and 
Richardson (2003)). Successful portfolio companies are exited via initial public offerings (IPOs) or sales 
to other companies, which generate capital inflows (and hopefully capital gains) that are distributed to the 
fund’s investors. The exit phase typically occupies the second half of the fund’s life. At the end of the 
fund’s life, any remaining portfolio holdings are sold or liquidated and the proceeds distributed to the 
investors. 
Owing to this investment cycle, relatively recent funds have not yet operated for long enough to 
measure their lifetime performance. But simply excluding relatively recent funds is sometimes felt to 
result in performance measures that do not reflect the changes in, and current state of, the VC industry. As 
a compromise, Kaplan and Schoar (2004) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) consider all funds raised 
up to and including 1999, but also show robustness to excluding funds that have not yet completed their 
ten-year runs as of the end of their sample period. In the same spirit, we consider all venture capital 
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investments made by VC funds raised between 1980 and 1999 that are included in the Venture Economics 
database. We begin in 1980 because venture capital as an asset class that attracts institutional investors 
has only existed since the 1980 ERISA “Safe Harbor” regulation.6 Closing the sample period at year-end 
1999 provides at least four years of operation for the youngest funds, using November 2003 as the latest 
date for measuring fund performance. Our results are robust to excluding funds that have not yet 
completed their ten-year lives. 
We concentrate solely on investments by U.S. based VC funds, and exclude investments by angels 
and buyout funds.7 We distinguish between funds and firms. While VC funds have a limited (usually ten-
year) life, the VC management firms that manage the funds have no predetermined lifespan. A first-time 
fund that is successful often enables the VC firm to raise a follow-on fund (Kaplan and Schoar (2004)), 
resulting in a sequence of funds raised a few years apart. We will measure VC experience and networks at 
the parent firm-level rather than the fund-level.8 This assumes that experience and contacts acquired in the 
running of one fund carry over to the firm’s next fund. 
In the estimation datasets, there are 3,469 VC funds managed by 1,974 VC firms which participate in 
47,705 investment rounds involving 16,315 portfolio companies. 44.7% of investment rounds and 50.3% 
of sample companies involve syndicated funding.  
We consider two definitions of syndicate. For directed data, we distinguish between VCs who lead 
syndicates (inviting others to join them and thereby perhaps earning favors, information, and future deal 
flow reciprocity), and VCs who are non-lead members of syndicates (who are invited to join, thereby 
gaining access to deal flow, information, and resources they otherwise may not have had access to). To do 
                                                 
6 The institutionalization of the VC industry is commonly dated to three events: The 1978 Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) whose “Prudent Man” rule allowed pension funds to invest in higher-risk asset classes; the 1980 
Small Business Investment Act which redefined VC fund managers as business development companies rather than 
investment advisers, so lowering their regulatory burdens; and the 1980 ERISA “Safe Harbor” regulation which 
sanctioned limited partnerships which are now the dominant organizational form in the industry. 
7 We do, however, include corporate venture programs as long as Venture Economics reports data for their size. 
8 Occasionally, Venture Economics assigns more than one name to the same VC firm (e.g. “Alex Brown and Sons,” 
“Alex Brown & Sons”). We manually consolidate VC firm names where applicable. 
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so, we examine syndicates at the investment round level. We define the syndicate as the collection of VC 
firms that invest in a given portfolio company investment round. As per convention, we identify the lead 
investor in the syndicate as the VC firm that makes the largest investment in the round.9  
For undirected data, we are primarily interested in the ties among VCs instanced by co-investment in 
the same portfolio company. Here, we are less concerned with whether the co-investment occurred in the 
same financing round or in different rounds, because we assume VC relationships are built by interacting 
with one another in board meetings and other activities that help the portfolio company succeed. Thus, a 
VC who invested in the company’s first round may interact with a VC who joined in the second round. To 
capture this, we examine syndicates at the company level and define the syndicate as the collection of VC 
firms that invested in a given portfolio company. All our results are robust, both in terms of economic and 
statistical significance, to employing either definition of syndicate for both directed and undirected 
networks.  
2.1 Fund Characteristics 
Table 1 describes our sample funds. The average VC fund in our sample had $64 million of capital 
available for investment, with a range from $0.1 million to $5 billion. (Fund size information is 
unavailable for 364 of the 3,469 sample funds.) Once successful, VC management firms tend to raise new 
funds. The fund sequence number denotes whether a fund is the first, second and so forth fund raised by a 
particular VC management firm. The average sample fund is a third fund, though sequence numbers are 
missing in Venture Economics for a third of the funds. A quarter of funds are identified as first-time 
funds. Around a third (36.5%) focus on seed or early-stage investment opportunities.  
Many VCs specialize in a particular industry, and important performance drivers such as investment 
opportunities and competition for deal flow likely vary across industries. Venture Economics does not 
identify which industry a fund specializes in, but it classifies the funds’ portfolio companies into six broad 
groups. We take a sample fund’s industry specialization to be the broad Venture Economics industry 
                                                 
9 Ties are broken by defining the lead investor as the VC with the largest cumulative investment in the company to date. 
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group that accounts for most of its invested capital. On this basis, 46.2% of funds specialize in “Computer 
related” companies, 18.9% in “Non-high-technology,” 9.2% in “Medical, health, life sciences,” 15.5% in 
“Communications and media,” 6% in “Biotechnology,” and 4.3% in “Semiconductors, other electronics.”  
2.2 Measuring Fund Performance 
Ideally, we would measure fund performance directly, using for instance the internal rate of return a 
fund achieved over its ten-year life. However, fund returns in the form required for this study are not 
systematically available to researchers as VC funds generally do not disclose their performance to anyone 
other than their own investors. Venture Economics collects fund performance data from VC investors, but 
only makes them publicly available in aggregate form (e.g., “the median IRR for funds raised in 1993 
was...”). Some researchers have recently had access to disaggregated performance data from Venture 
Economics, but only in anonymized format (see Kaplan and Schoar (2004); Jones and Rhodes-Kropf 
(2003)). Absent a facility for identifying individual funds and thus matching their performance data to 
their network characteristics and other cross-sectional variables, these anonymized data would not help us 
examine the effect of VC networking on investment performance. 
Instead, we measure fund performance indirectly. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) report that 
75.3% of investments are written off completely in the average VC fund in their sample. This implies that 
VC funds earn their capital gains from a small subset of their portfolio companies, namely those that they 
exit via an IPO or a sale to another company (M&A).10 All else equal, the more successful exits a fund 
has, the larger will be its IRR. Thus, we take as our main proxy for VC fund performance the fraction of 
the fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully exited via an IPO or M&A transaction, as 
identified in the Venture Economics database as of November 2003. In Section 3.5, we show that this is a 
reasonable proxy for fund returns. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on our performance measure. In the sample of 3,469 funds 
raised between 1980 and 1999, the exit rate averages 34.2%. IPOs outnumber M&A transactions three-to-
                                                 
10 Unsuccessful investments are typically shut down or sold back to management.  
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two (with exit rates of 20.7% and 13.6%, respectively). These exit rates are comparable to those reported 
in Gompers and Lerner (2000) for the 1987-1991 period. Our results are robust to computing exit rates 
using instead the fraction of dollars invested in companies that are successfully exited. Dollar exit rates 
are a little higher, averaging 35.8%.  
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of exit rates over time, plotting the average exit rate of all sample 
funds by vintage year. Exit rates peaked among funds raised in 1988, and there is mild evidence of an 
upward trend in exit rates among funds raised before 1988 and a more pronounced downward trend 
among funds raised since. The youngest funds – those raised in 1998 and 1999 – have markedly lower 
exit rates. This could be because they have yet to complete their ten-year investment lives. Alternatively, 
the deterioration in the investment climate and, especially, in the IPO market since the bursting of the dot-
com and technology bubbles of the late 1990s may result in these funds never matching the performance 
of earlier VC vintages. Whatever the reason, to capture the pronounced time pattern evident in Figure 1, 
we include year dummies throughout our fund-level analysis.  
2.3 Company-level Performance Measures  
Data limitations prevent us from computing company-level rates of return: The Venture Economics 
database does not include details on the fraction of equity acquired by the VCs or the securities they hold, 
and occasionally lacks information even on the amount invested.11 Instead, we use two indirect measures 
of company-level performance. Most venture-backed investments are “staged” in the sense that portfolio 
companies are periodically reevaluated and receive follow-on funding only if their prospects remain 
promising (Gompers (1995)). Thus, we view survival to another funding round as an interim signal of 
success. Eventually, successful portfolio companies are taken public or sold. Absent return data, we 
follow Gompers and Lerner (1998, 2000), Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) and Sorensen (2003) in 
                                                 
11 But see Cochrane (2004) for an analysis of company-level rates of return using data from an alternative database 
(VentureOne), and see Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) for similar analysis using a proprietary dataset of 4,000 private 
equity-backed companies. 
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taking the occurrence of an IPO or M&A transaction as a final signal of the investment’s success.12 
We restrict the dataset to companies that received their first institutional funding round between 1980 
and 1999, and record their subsequent funding rounds and, if applicable, exit events through November 
2003.13 Figure 2 shows what happened to these 16,315 companies. Around a third of the companies do 
not survive beyond the first funding round and are thus written off. 1,020 companies (6.3%) proceed to an 
IPO or M&A transaction after the first round. The remaining 9,875 companies (60.5%) receive follow-on 
funding. Conditional on surviving to round 2, the survival probability increases: Of the 9,875 companies 
having survived round 1, 7.7% exit and 70% survive to round 3. Conditional on surviving to round 3, 
10.1% exit and 69.2% survive to round 4. And so forth. Overall, 4,235 of the 16,315 portfolio companies 
(26%) have successfully exited by November 2003. The median company receives two funding rounds. 
It is important to realize that Venture Economics provides next to no information about the portfolio 
companies, beyond the dates of the funding rounds, the identity of the investors, subsequent exits, and the 
companies’ Venture Economics industry classification. Of the 16,315 companies with first rounds in the 
dataset, 32.7% are classified by Venture Economics as “Computer related,” 30.9% as “Non-high-
technology,” 14.1% as “Communications and media,” 10.9% as “Medical, health, life sciences,” 6.4% as 
“Semiconductors, other electronics,” and 4.9% as “Biotechnology.”  
2.4 VC Firm Experience 
Kaplan and Schoar (2004) provide convincing evidence of persistence in returns across a sequence of 
funds managed by the same VC firm. Such persistence highlights the importance of investment skill and 
experience. While skill is difficult to measure, we derive four proxies of investment experience for each 
VC firm and for each year the VC firm is active in the sample. These control variables measure the age of 
the VC firm (the number of days since the VC firm’s first-ever investment), the number of rounds the 
                                                 
12 Unlike Gompers and Lerner (1998) and Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002), we account for successful exits via M&A 
transactions as well as IPOs. 
13 We thus exclude companies (and all their funding rounds) that received their first institutional funding round before 
1980, even if they subsequently received follow-on funding after 1980. Our dataset does, however, include companies 
that received a non-institutional funding round prior to 1980 (typically involving angel investors or friends and family). 
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firm has participated in, the cumulative total amount it has invested, and the number of portfolio 
companies it has backed. Each is calculated using data from the VC firm’s creation to year t.14 To 
illustrate, by the time Sequoia Capital raised Fund IX in 1999, it had been active for 24 years, had 
participated in 888 rounds investing a total of $1,275 million in 379 separate portfolio companies. 
2.5 Network Measures  
Over our sample period, the VC industry saw substantial entry and exit and thus a considerable 
reordering of relationships. To capture the dynamics of these processes, we construct a new network for 
each year t, using data on syndications from the five years ending in t. Within each of these five-year 
windows, we make no distinction between relationships reflected in earlier or later syndicates. We then 
use the resulting adjacency matrices to construct the five centrality measures described in Section 1. 
The parent of the average sample fund has normalized outdegree of 1.203%, indegree of 1.003%, and 
degree of 4.237% (see Table 1). This means that the average VC, when acting as lead, involves a little 
over 1% of all VCs active in the market at the time as co-investors; is invited to become a syndicate 
member by around 1% of all VCs; and has co-investment relationships with a little over 4% of the other 
VCs (ignoring its and their roles in the syndicate). Coupled with the fact that more than half of all 
investments are syndicated, these low degree centrality scores suggest that VCs each repeatedly co-invest 
with a small set of other VCs, that is, that relationships are relatively exclusive and stable. 
To illustrate the variation in the degree measures, we consider the extremes. Over the five years 
ending in 1999, New Enterprise Associates syndicated with the largest number of VCs (369). By contrast, 
186 (10.3%) of the 1,812 VC firms active in the market during the 1995-1999 window never syndicated 
any investments, preferring instead to invest on their own. 
Betweenness and eigenvector centrality average 0.29% and 3.74% of their respective theoretical 
maximum. Throughout most of the 1990s, New Enterprise Associates had the highest betweenness 
                                                 
14 Since Venture Economics’ data are somewhat unreliable before 1980, we ignore investments dated earlier than 1975. 
This coding convention does not affect our results. 
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centrality scores (standing “between” approximately 6% of all possible VC pairs), only to be overtaken by 
Intel Capital, the venture capital arm of Intel Corp, in 1999. 
2.6 The Macro Structure of VC Networks 
Table 2 provides a macro-level description of each of our five-year networks, from 1976-1980 to 
1999-2003. We list the number of VC firms that lead-manage an investment round in each five-year 
window, the total number of VCs that participate in investment rounds, and the number of investment 
rounds concluded during the window. For instance, during the five years to 1980, 374 VC firms 
participated in 1,541 investment rounds, 243 of whom acted one or more times as lead investor. 
Overall, VC syndication networks are not particularly dense. As a proportion of all the relationships 
between every pair of VCs that could be present, the density of undirected ties peaked at 4.5% in 1987-
1991 and has been declining to below 2% since. Directed ties (i.e., those between lead VC and syndicate 
members) are even less dense. In part, this simply reflects the large number of VCs and the tendency of 
some VCs never to syndicate their investments,15 but it likely also reflects the aforementioned exclusivity 
and repeated nature of syndication relationships evident in the low individual degree centrality scores. 
Low density can suggest high centralization. A simple way to measure the overall centralization of a 
network (as opposed to the centrality of individual actors) is to express the network-wide variation in the 
actors’ degree, betweenness, and eigenvector centralities as a percentage of the variation we would 
observe in the most centralized network, a perfect star, of equivalent size. The resulting centralization 
numbers can be interpreted as measures of the degree of inequality in the network. As Table 2 shows, 
outdegree, degree, and eigenvector centrality are each relatively unequally distributed, suggesting that the 
power of individual VCs varies substantially. In other words, positional advantage is quite unequally 
distributed in our networks. 
2.7 Competition for Deal Flow and Investment Opportunities 
Our models include a range of control variables. Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that the prices 
                                                 
15 All our results are robust to excluding VC firms that never syndicate. 
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VCs pay when investing in portfolio companies increase as more money flows into the VC industry, 
holding investment opportunities constant. They interpret this pattern as evidence that competition for 
scarce investment opportunities drives up valuations. If so, it seems plausible that competition for deal 
flow also affects the quality of VCs’ investments and thus performance. We therefore include in our fund-
level and company-level models the aggregate VC fund inflows in the year a sample fund was raised and 
the year a portfolio company completed a funding round, respectively. Table 1 shows that the average 
sample fund was raised in a year in which $23.8 billion flowed into the VC industry. This ranges from a 
low of $2.3 billion (1980) to a high of $84.6 billion (1999). 
Controlling for the investment opportunities open to a VC is harder. Gompers and Lerner (2000) 
propose public-market pricing multiples as indirect measures of the investment climate in the private 
markets. There is a long tradition in corporate finance, based on Tobin (1969), that views low book-to-
market (B/M) ratios in an industry as an indication of favorable investment opportunities. Price-earnings 
(P/E) ratios are sometimes used for the same purpose. By definition, private companies lack market value 
data, so we must rely on multiples from publicly traded companies. To allow for inter-industry differences 
in investment opportunities, we map all COMPUSTAT companies into the six broad Venture Economics 
industries. We begin with VC-backed companies that Venture Economics identifies as having gone 
public, and for which therefore SIC codes are available. We then identify which Venture Economics 
industry each available four-digit SIC code is linked to most often.16 We compute the pricing multiple for 
each of the six Venture Economics industries in year t as the value-weighted average multiple of all 
COMPUSTAT companies in the relevant four-digit SIC industries.17  
                                                 
16 Similar results are obtained when using three-digit SIC codes. 
17 We define a public company’s P/E ratio as the ratio of stock price (COMPUSTAT data item #199) to earnings-per-
share excluding extraordinary items (#58). We define the B/M ratio as the ratio of book equity to market equity, where 
book equity is defined as total assets (#6) minus liabilities (#181) minus preferred stock (#10, #56, or #130, in order of 
availability) plus deferred tax and investment tax credit (#35), and market equity is defined as stock price (#199) 
multiplied by shares outstanding (#25). To control for outliers, we follow standard convention and winsorize the P/E and 
B/M ratios at the 5th and 95th percentiles for the universe of firms in COMPUSTAT in that year. (The results are robust to 
other winsorization cutoffs.) To calculate a value-weighted average, we consider as weights both the firm’s market value 
(market value of equity plus liabilities minus deferred tax and investment tax credit plus preferred stock) and the dollar 
amount of investment in each four-digit SIC code each year (as calculated from the Venture Economics database). 
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VC funds take a number of years to invest their available capital. Thus, we have to decide over what 
time period to measure their investment opportunities. For the purpose of the fund-level analyses in 
Section 3, we average B/M and P/E ratios over each fund’s first three years of existence, to approximate 
its active investment period. Results are robust to using longer or shorter windows. Table 1 reveals the 
average fund to face a P/E ratio of 16.4 and a B/M ratio of 0.514 in its industry of specialization over the 
first three years of its life. 
3. Fund-level Analysis 
3.1 Benchmark Determinants of Fund Performance 
We begin by replicating Kaplan and Schoar’s (2004) fund performance model, to validate our use of 
exit rates instead of fund returns as the measure of performance. Kaplan and Schoar relate VC fund 
performance to two fund characteristics (as well as a set of vintage year dummies): Log fund size and log 
fund sequence number, each of which is included in levels and squares. Our results are reported in Table 
3. When we include both fund size and fund sequence number in the model, only the year dummies are 
significant (see column (1)).18 Consistent with Kaplan and Schoar, we find only weak evidence that 
higher sequence number funds perform better (p=0.099) once we exclude fund size in column (2), and 
strong evidence that larger funds perform significantly better (p<0.001) once we exclude fund sequence 
number in column (3). As in Kaplan and Schoar (whose dataset is a subset of ours), the relation between 
fund performance and fund size is increasing and concave, consistent with diminishing returns to scale. 
The adjusted R2 in model (3) is 13.6%.  
Because fund sequence number appears to have little effect on fund performance in our dataset, and 
because it is frequently unavailable in the Venture Economics database, we replace it with a dummy 
equaling one for first-time funds. We also control for funds that Venture Economics classifies as seed or 
                                                 
18 It is difficult to control directly for exit market conditions over the life of a fund, as market conditions may vary widely 
over the 7+ years in which portfolio companies are likely to reach exit stage. The year fixed effects may help control for 
heterogeneity in exit rates related to the fund’s vintage year timing (and hence subsequent exit market conditions). See 
Section 4.3 for company-level models that control explicitly for exit market conditions. 
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early-stage funds, on the assumption that such funds invest in riskier companies and so have relatively 
fewer successful exits. The resulting model is shown in column (4). In addition to the positive and 
concave effect of fund size, we find that first-time funds perform significantly worse, mirroring Kaplan 
and Schoar’s (2004) results: All else equal, first-time funds have exit rates that are 3.6 percentage points 
below average (that is, 30.9% rather than 34.5%). In this specification, seed and early-stage funds do not 
perform differently from other funds. 
The model shown in column (5) adds the log of vintage-year VC fund inflows in an attempt to control 
for Gompers and Lerner’s (2000) “money chasing deals” result, whereby inflows of capital into VC funds 
increase the competition for a limited number of attractive investment opportunities. Consistent with the 
spirit of their results, we find that funds subsequently perform significantly worse the more money flowed 
into the VC industry in the year they were raised. The effect is large economically: A one-standard-
deviation increase in vintage-year fund inflows reduces exit rates by seven percentage points from the 
34.5% estimation sample average, holding all other covariates at their sample means. Columns (6) and (7) 
add to this specification our two proxies for the investment opportunities funds faced when deploying 
their committed capital. Whether we use industry P/E ratios or industry B/M ratios, the results indicate 
that a more favorable investment climate at the time a fund invested its capital is followed by significantly 
higher exit rates. Of the two, B/M ratios have the larger economic effect, with a one-standard-deviation 
decrease in the B/M ratio among publicly traded companies in the fund’s industry of specialization being 
associated with a 7.7 percentage point increase in subsequent exit rates. The models that follow will 
include industry B/M ratios, though we note that all results are robust to using industry P/E ratios instead.  
3.2 The Effect of Firm Experience on Fund Performance 
From now on, we take the model shown in column (7) of Table 3 as our baseline fund performance 
model. Before we turn to the effect of network position on fund performance, we control for the 
investment experience of the fund’s parent firm using the four proxies described in Table 1. Due to the 
high degree of correlation among the four proxies, we include them in the baseline model one at a time. In 
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each case, the explanatory power of the models, shown in Table 4, improves substantially.  
However we measure it, funds with more experienced parents perform significantly better. One-
standard-deviation increases in the log number of days since the parent’s first-ever investment, the log 
number of rounds the parent has participated in, the log aggregate amount it has invested, and the log 
number of portfolio companies it has funded, each measured over the five years ending the year the VC 
fund was raised, increase exit rates by 3.7, 3.5, 4.4, and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. Note that the 
first-fund dummy loses significance in these models, indicating that it is a poor proxy for experience. 
Since the log aggregate investment amount proxy has the largest economic effect, we will use it in all 
subsequent models to proxy for the parent firm’s experience. Our results are generally robust to using any 
of the other three proxies instead. 
3.3 The Effect of Firm Networks on Fund Performance 
Having controlled for fund characteristics, competition for deal flow, investment opportunities, and 
parent firm experience, does a VC’s network centrality (measured over the prior five years) improve the 
performance of its fund (over the next ten years)? The results, shown in Table 5, indicate that it is does. 
We estimate five separate regression models, adding our five centrality measures to the specification 
shown in column (3) of Table 4. We add them one at a time given the relatively high degree of correlation 
among them.19 Each specification in Table 5 suggests that better networked VC firms are associated with 
significantly better fund performance, and the adjusted R2 increases to around 19%.20 Of the five network 
measures, the eigenvectors have the largest economic effect: A one-standard-deviation increase in this 
measure of centrality is associated with a 2.3 percentage point increase in fund performance, all else 
equal. The economic effect of the other four measures ranges from one percentage point for betweenness 
                                                 
19 One obvious concern is that our network centrality measures merely proxy for (or are cleaner measures of) VC parent 
firm experience. However, the pairwise correlations between the experience measure and the five measures of network 
centralities are relatively low, ranging from 36.8% to 43.9%. These low correlations suggest that the network measures do 
not simply reflect VC experience. 
20 If we restrict the sample to funds raised prior to 1995, to ensure each sample fund has completed its ten-year life, 
betweenness and outdegree cease to be significant at conventional levels. Indegree, degree, and eigenvectors continue to 
be positively and significantly related to fund performance. 
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to 2.2 percentage points for indegree. 
These results illustrate the importance of considering more than one measure of a VC’s centrality, as 
each captures certain unique elements of the VC’s ties to other VCs. Based on the above economic 
significance examples, VCs benefit from having many ties (degree), especially when these ties involve 
other well-connected VCs (eigenvector), while having the ability to act as a broker between other VCs 
(betweenness) plays a lesser role. 
3.4 Performance Persistence and Reverse Causality 
We do not believe that our results are driven simply by reverse causality (that is, the argument that 
superior performance enables VCs to improve their network positions, rather than the other way around). 
Recall that we construct the network centrality measures from syndication data for the five years before a 
fund is created. The fact that these data can help explain fund performance over the next ten years 
suggests that networking truly affects performance.  
A potentially more serious concern is persistence in performance from fund to fund. To rule out that 
the network measures are simply proxying for omitted persistence in performance, we re-estimate our 
fund-level models including among the regressors the exit rate of the VC firm’s most recent past fund. 
Note that this restricts our sample to VC firms that have raised at least two funds between 1980 and 1999; 
first-time funds and VC firms that do not raise follow-on funds are necessarily excluded.21  
The results are shown in Table 6. While we do find evidence of performance persistence, we continue 
to find that better networked VC firms enjoy better fund performance, all else equal. The economic 
magnitude of the performance persistence is large: A one-standard-deviation increase in the exit rate of 
the VC firm’s most recent past fund is associated with a 4.9 percentage point increase in the current 
fund’s exit rate. As before, the five network centrality measures affect exit rates positively, and three of 
them do so significantly. The economic magnitude remains similar: All else equal, a one-standard-
                                                 
21 We obtain similar (and somewhat stronger) results if we include all funds, setting the prior performance variable equal 
to zero for first-time funds and including a dummy variable identifying first-time funds. 
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deviation increase in network centrality is associated with a 2.3, 1.9, and 2.1 percentage point increase in 
fund performance, for indegree, degree, and eigenvectors, respectively. 
3.5 Exit Rates and Internal Rates of Return 
To ascertain the extent to which our measure of fund performance, exit rates, relates to fund returns, 
we use a sample of fund IRRs that have recently been disclosed by a number of public pension plans and 
state universities following Freedom of Information Act suits. Such data are available for 188 of the 3,469 
funds in our sample. While this sample is small and not necessarily representative, it provides us with an 
opportunity to partially examine the relation between exit rates and IRRs and thus the robustness of our 
fund performance results. 
The correlation between exit rates and IRRs is 0.42 (p<0.001), suggesting that exit rates are a useful 
but noisy proxy for IRRs. We re-estimate our fund-level performance models on the subsample of funds 
for which IRRs are available. (To conserve space, the results are not reported in tables.) This both 
weakens and strengthens our results. On the one hand, the coefficients estimated for outdegree, degree, 
and betweenness are no longer statistically significant. On the other, the coefficient estimates for indegree 
and eigenvector are not only statistically significant, they are also very large economically: IRRs increase 
by between 11 and 14 percentage points from the 15% sample average for one-standard-deviation 
increases in indegree and eigenvector. The adjusted R2s in all five models are high, ranging from 27.8% 
for the outdegree specification to 30% for the eigenvector specification.  
There are two rival explanations for the reduced ability of the outdegree, degree, and betweenness 
measures to explain fund performance in these specifications. It may be the case that using exit rates gives 
rise to misleading inference: i.e., networking can explain exit rates but not IRRs. Or it may be the case 
that in the much smaller sample of funds for which IRRs are available, the networking measures have a 
hard time explaining both IRRs and exit rates. From the data, it appears the latter is the case. In the 
subsample of funds for which we have IRR data, we find none of the five network measures to be 
statistically significant in explaining exit rates.   
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Finally, we regress IRRs on exit rates to help interpret economic significance in our exit rate models 
(results not shown). On average, funds break even (i.e., IRR=0) at an exit rate of 18.8%. Beyond 18.8%, 
each 1% increase in exit rates is associated with a 1.046% increase in IRRs (p<0.001). If we are willing to 
assume that the relation between IRRs and exit rates remains roughly one-to-one in the overall sample 
(for which we do not have IRR data), this suggests that we can translate the economic significance 
exercises in the previous sections into IRR gains on nearly a one-for-one basis. In other words, a two 
percentage point increase in exit rates (from the mean of around 35%) is roughly equivalent to a two 
percentage point increase in IRR (from a mean of around 15%). 
4. Company-level Analysis  
We now turn to estimating the effect of VC networking on portfolio company performance. In the 
absence of company-level rates of return data, we measure company performance indirectly. In terms of 
Figure 2, we model the likelihood that a company survives – in the sense of proceeding to another funding 
round or exiting via an IPO or M&A transaction – rather than being written off.22 Our analysis focuses on 
the first three funding rounds, for the sake of brevity. While the choice of three rounds is arbitrary, our 
results do not change if we consider later rounds as well. 
The results are shown in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 relates company survival over the first three rounds 
to the same variables used to model fund performance in Table 4: The characteristics of the lead investor 
(such as fund size and whether it is a first-time fund); the VC inflow proxy for competition for deal flow, 
measured as of the year in which the funding round took place; the B/M proxy for investment 
opportunities in the portfolio company’s Venture Economics industry, as of the funding year; and the four 
proxies for the lead investor’s investment experience (measured from the investor’s founding date to the 
date of the funding round). Table 8 adds our set of network measures. Though not shown, we also include 
industry effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in company-level survival rates. Recall that 
                                                 
22 All results in this section are robust to restricting the sample to funds raised prior to 1995, to ensure each sample fund 
has completed its ten-year life. 
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Venture Economics provides no data on company characteristics, such as sales or earnings. 
The dependent variable in Tables 7 and 8 is an indicator variable for company survival between 
funding rounds, equaling one if the company survived from round N to receive another funding round or 
exited successfully, and zero if it was written off after round N. Since we focus on survival from the first 
three rounds (i.e., N=1..3), we estimate three separate models labeled in the table as “survived round 1,” 
“…2,” and “…3.” Clearly, as survival to round N+1 is conditional on having survived to round N, the 
sample size decreases from round to round. (Note also that due to missing fund size data, there are fewer 
observations available for estimation than are shown in Figure 2.) To mitigate collinearity problems, we 
include the four investment experience proxies one at a time, so Table 7 shows a total of 12 models. In 
Table 8, we include only one of the experience proxies and add the five network measures one at a time, 
resulting in 15 models. All models are estimated using probit MLE. 
4.1 The Determinants of Portfolio Company Survival 
We first discuss the results shown in Table 7. The pseudo R2s decrease across the three funding 
rounds considered, suggesting that as companies become more established, company-specific variables 
(which we cannot control for) become relatively more important drivers of company survival. Our models 
explain approximately 9% of the variation in survival rates from round 1, 4% for round 2 survival, and 
around 2% for round 3 survival.  
We find a significant increasing and concave relation between the lead investor’s fund size and a 
portfolio company’s survival from any of the first three rounds. This echoes the finding in the previous 
section that larger funds have higher exit rates. First-time funds that lead an investment round are 
associated with significantly worse survival probabilities, especially from round 3. The more money the 
VC industry raised from investors at the time of the funding round, the less likely a portfolio company is 
to survive, and this is true across all three rounds. Interpreting fund inflows as a proxy for competition for 
deal flow, this suggests that funds make more marginal investment choices at times when investment 
capital is plentiful, leading to poorer survival records. A more favorable investment environment, as 
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proxied by a lower average industry B/M ratio, significantly improves a company’s chances of survival, 
again across all three rounds. The beneficial effect of low competition and favorable investment 
opportunities is strongest economically in the first two rounds. 
Controlling for these factors, we find mixed evidence for the effect of the lead investor’s investment 
experience on portfolio company survival. The only proxy that has a consistently positive effect is the log 
number of rounds the lead investor has participated in over its lifetime, and even this measure of 
experience matters only for survival from rounds 1 and 2; once a company has reached round 3, its 
continued survival does not appear to depend on its lead investor’s experience.  
Table 8 adds the five network measures one at a time. We measure the VC parent firm’s network 
centrality over the five-year window preceding the investment round. (For example, for a second round 
investment made in 1995, the centrality measures are calculated from data for the years 1991-1995.) In 
each of the fifteen probit models, better networked investors are associated with significantly higher 
company survival probabilities. To illustrate the economic magnitude, consider a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the lead VC’s eigenvector centrality measure. This increases the survival probability in the 
first round from the unconditional expectation of 66.8% to 72.4%, in the second round from 77.7% to 
83.4%, and in the third round from 79.2% to 86.4%.  
Using a sample of Canadian companies, Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) find that syndicated VC 
deals have higher returns. In the same spirit, it is possible that syndication itself may improve a 
company’s survival chances. If better-networked VCs are more likely to syndicate a given deal, we may 
be confusing the beneficial effects of syndication with the beneficial effect of being backed by a well-
networked VC. To rule out this concern, we re-estimate our models incorporating dummy variables for (a) 
whether the current round was syndicated or (b) whether any of the company’s previous investment 
rounds was syndicated. To conserve space, we do not report the results in tables. The positive effect of 
our network measures on portfolio company survival to the next funding round or exit remains robust to 
controlling for whether or not the deal was syndicated. 
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4.2 Pooled Portfolio Company Survival Models 
So far, we have estimated round-by-round survival models. We now consider a more parsimonious 
specification which takes the panel nature of the data explicitly into account. We track each of the sample 
companies from its first funding round across all rounds to the date of its exit or November 2003, 
whichever is sooner. In this panel structure, the dependent variable equals one in round N if the company 
survived to round N+1. Unless it subsequently exited via an IPO or M&A transaction, the dependent 
variable is zero in the company’s last recorded round. All models are estimated using panel probit 
estimators with random company effects. The panel is unbalanced since portfolio companies receive 
varying numbers of funding rounds. We estimate five models, including the five network measures one at 
a time. As before, network centrality is measured from the VC syndication network over the five-year 
window preceding the investment round. Note that the identity of the lead investor is allowed to change 
across rounds.  
The results are reported in Table 9. Irrespective of which aspect of the lead investor’s network 
connections we control for, we find a significant increasing and concave relation between the lead 
investor’s fund size and a portfolio company’s survival. Greater VC fund inflows and a less favorable 
investment environment significantly reduce a company’s chances of survival, as before. The effect of the 
lead investor’s investment experience, measured as the lead investor’s log aggregate amount invested, 
reduces a company’s survival chances in each of the five specifications.  
Controlling for these factors, we find that a portfolio company’s survival probability increases, the 
better networked its lead investor. This is true for all five centrality measures. The economic effect is 
large. Taking the eigenvector centrality measure to illustrate, a one-standard-deviation increase in this 
variable is associated with an 8.2 percentage point increase from the unconditional survival probability of 
66.8%, holding all other covariates at their sample means. 
4.3 Portfolio Company Exit 
Finally, we equate good performance with a successful exit (ignoring survival to another funding 
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round) and ask whether the VC firm’s network centrality helps accelerate a portfolio company’s exit.23 
For this purpose, we compute the number of quarters between a company’s first funding round and the 
earlier of a) its exit, b) the end of the VC fund’s ten-year life, and c) November 2003. Companies that 
have not exited by the fund’s tenth anniversary are assumed to have been liquidated. Companies backed 
by funds that are in existence beyond November 2003 are treated as “right-censored” (to allow for the 
possibility that they may yet exit successfully after the end of our sample period). Allowing for right-
censoring, the average time-to-exit in our sample is 24 quarters.  
We relate the log time-to-exit to our network measures controlling for fund and firm characteristics, 
competition for deal flow and investment opportunities at the time of the company’s first funding round, 
and conditions in the stock market in general and the IPO and M&A markets in particular. Market 
conditions are allowed to vary over time, to allow VC firms to react to improvements in (say) IPO 
conditions by taking a portfolio company public. We proxy for conditions in the stock market using the 
quarterly return on the NASDAQ Composite Index. To measure exit market conditions, we use the 
quarterly log number of IPOs and the quarterly log number of M&A deals in the portfolio company’s 
Venture Economics industry. All three variables are lagged by a quarter, to allow for the necessary delay 
in preparing a company for exit. 
Our time-to-exit models are estimated in the form of accelerated-time-to-failure models.24 These are 
hazard (or duration) models written with log time as the dependent variable. Parametric hazard models 
require that we specify a distribution for log time. While our results are robust to alternative choices, we 
assume that log time is normally distributed. This has the advantage that the hazard rate (the instantaneous 
probability of exiting in the next instance given that a company has not exited so far) first increases and 
                                                 
23 Econometrically, this is similar in spirit to Hellmann and Puri (2000) who investigate whether VC backing reduces the 
time it takes a start-up company to bring its product to market. 
24 We obtain qualitatively similar results if we estimate simple probits of whether or not a portfolio company exits 
successfully. However, probits have two shortcomings in our setting. They cannot account for the right-censoring caused 
by the fact that some funds remain active beyond the November 2003 end of our sample period; and they cannot easily 
accommodate controls for exit market conditions, since it is unclear at what point in time such conditions should be 
measured in the case of companies that do not exit. 
  
28
then decreases over time. Other distributions imply either a constant hazard rate (e.g., exponential) or 
hazards that increase (or decrease) monotonically over time (e.g., Weibull or Gompertz). In the context of 
VC investments, monotonic hazard functions are implausible: It is neither the case that companies are 
never more likely to exit than at the time of their first round (a monotonically decreasing hazard function) 
nor that companies become ever more likely to exit the longer they have languished in the VC’s portfolio 
(a monotonically increasing hazard function).25  
The results are reported in Table 10. While fund size has no effect on time-to-exit, we find that first-
time funds exit their portfolio companies significantly faster, in around 20.5 rather than 24 quarters, all 
else equal. This is consistent with Gompers’ (1996) finding that younger funds “grandstand” by taking 
portfolio companies public as early as possible. Companies that received their first funding at a time when 
a lot of money flowed into the VC industry (interpreted as increased competition for deal flow) or when 
industry book-to-market ratios were low (interpreted as relatively poor investment opportunities) take 
significantly longer to exit. More experienced VC firms exit their portfolio companies significantly faster. 
These results mirror those in the previous tables. In addition, we find that higher returns on the NASDAQ 
Composite Index and an increase in the number of IPOs (but not M&A deals) are associated with a 
significant increase in the probability that a portfolio company will exit in the next quarter. This is 
consistent with Lerner’s (1994b) findings. 
Controlling for these effects, we find that each of the five centrality measures has a negative and 
significant effect on time-to-exit. Eigenvector has the largest effect economically. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the lead VC’s eigenvector centrality is associated with a two-quarter decrease from 
the unconditional time-to-exit of 24 quarters. The corresponding effects for the three degree network 
measures are around one quarter. Thus, companies benefit from being backed by VCs who have many ties 
(degree), especially when these ties involve other well-connected VCs (eigenvector). 
5. Location- and Industry-specific Networks  
                                                 
25 A way of avoiding a specific distribution is to estimate semi-parametric Cox models. This does not affect our results. 
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The network measures we have used thus far implicitly assume that each VC in the U.S. potentially 
syndicates with every other VC in the U.S.  To the extent that VC networks in truth are more 
geographically concentrated, or involve only VCs specializing in a certain industry, we may 
underestimate a VC’s network centrality. For instance, a given biotech VC firm may be central in a 
network of biotech VCs, but may lack connections to non-biotech VCs in the overall network of U.S.-
based VCs. Similarly, a VC firm headquartered in Silicon Valley may be well connected in California but 
not in a network that includes East Coast VC firms. 
To assess the robustness of our findings we have re-estimated all our models using centrality 
measures derived from (a) industry-specific networks defined using the six broad Venture Economics 
industries, and (b) a network of Californian VC firms. (We refrain from constructing networks for other 
geographic areas due to the comparatively small number of VC firms in areas outside California.) In each 
case, we continue to construct the networks on the basis of trailing five-year windows. To conserve space, 
we do not report the results in tables.  
Using industry-specific networks slightly strengthens our fund-level results, in the sense of both 
higher adjusted R2s and larger economic effects. For instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in a 
firm’s indegree increases its funds’ exit rates by 2.5 percentage points in the industry-specific models, 
compared to 2.2 percentage points using the overall network. In the company-level models, our results are 
qualitatively unchanged compared to Tables 7 through 10, and the industry network measures do not 
obviously dominate the overall network measures.  
Restricting the network to Californian VCs reduces the sample of funds to 872 funds (for which all 
necessary variables are available) and the sample of portfolio companies to 4,691. The network measures 
continue to improve fund performance significantly, and the economic magnitude of the effects is 
considerably larger than before: On the order of 4-5 percentage point improvements in fund exit rates 
(from the unconditional mean of 35.7%), compared to 1-2 percentage points in the overall sample. In the 
company-level models, our network measures continue to be positively and significantly related to 
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company survival and exit probabilities, and the economic magnitude of the effects is similar to the 
models shown in Tables 8 through 10.  
6. Conclusion 
Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm’s-
length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice 
in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments. We use a 
comprehensive sample of U.S. based VCs over the period 1980 to 2003. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to examine the relation between fund and portfolio company performance and 
measures of networking among VCs.  
Controlling for known determinants of VC investment performance, we find that VC funds whose 
parent firms enjoy more influential network positions have significantly better performance, as measured 
by the proportion of portfolio company investments that are successfully exited through an initial public 
offering or a sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better networked VC firms 
are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent rounds of financing and to eventual exit. The 
magnitude of these effects is economically large, and is robust to a wide range of specifications. Our 
portfolio company models suggest that the benefits of being associated with a well-connected VC are 
more pronounced in later funding rounds. Interestingly, once we control for network effects in our models 
of fund and portfolio company performance, the importance of how much investment experience a VC 
has is reduced, and in some specifications, eliminated.  
Our analysis provides a first look at the importance of networks as a choice of organizational form in 
the venture capital industry. We leave for future research the question how networking affects 
performance in other financial markets, such as syndicated lending, bond or equity underwriting, and 
investment bank-institutional investor relationships. 
Our findings have ramifications for institutional investors who are choosing a VC fund in which to 
invest, as they suggest that more highly networked VCs may enjoy better investment performance. 
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Additionally, our analysis provides a deeper understanding of the possible drivers of cross-sectional 
performance of VC funds, and suggests the importance of additional fundamentals beyond those 
previously documented in the academic literature. Finally, our findings shed light on the industrial 
organization of the VC market. Given the large returns to being well-networked we document, enhancing 
one’s network position should be an important strategic consideration for an incumbent VC, while 
presenting a potential barrier to entry for new VCs.  
Our finding that better networked VCs enjoy superior performance raises the question of how 
networks arise in the first place. What determines a VC’s choice whether or not to network? What are the 
costs associated with becoming well-networked? What are the dynamics of network evolution? How does 
one form relationships with influential VCs in the network? These questions will be addressed in future 
research.
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Appendix: Network Analysis Example 
To illustrate the application of network analysis tools to VC syndication networks, consider a network 
of four VCs labeled A, B, C, and D. Suppose their syndication history is as follows: 
• Syndicate 1: C (lead), D 
• Syndicate 2: C (lead), A, B 
• Syndicate 3: A (lead), C 
• Syndicate 4: B (lead), A 
The corresponding adjacency matrix is  
 Syndicate members 
 A B C D 
A - 1 1 0 
B 1 - 1 0 
C 1 1 - 1 
L
ea
d 
V
C
 
D 0 0 1 - 
 
Note that the matrix is symmetric. It reflects the “undirected” ties between the VCs (ignoring the direction 
of the ties). Each cell is coded one or zero, to denote the presence or absence of a syndication relationship, 
respectively. The following “directed” adjacency matrix accounts for the difference between leading a 
syndicate and being a non-lead member: 
 Syndicate members 
 A B C D 
A - 0 1 0 
B 1 - 0 0 
C 1 1 - 1 
L
ea
d 
V
C
 
D 0 0 0 - 
 
Here, row vectors record syndicate leadership while column vectors record syndicate membership, and 
the matrix is no longer symmetric. The row vectors show that A has led (at least) one syndicate in which 
C was a member, B has led at least one syndicate in which A was a member, C has led one syndicate each 
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in which A, B and D were members, and D has led no syndicates. The column vectors show that A has 
been a (non-lead) member of syndicates led by B and C, B has been a (non-lead) member of syndicate(s) 
led by C, C has been a (non-lead) member of syndicate(s) led by A, and D has been a (non-lead) member 
of syndicate(s) led by C.  
Intuitively, C appears the best connected: C leads more syndicates than the other VCs, participates in 
more syndicates than any VC except A (with whom C ties), and is the only VC to have syndicated with D. 
Thus, C is said to have greater “centrality,” in the sense of having a highly favored position in the network 
giving access to information, deal flow, deeper pools of capital, contacts, expertise, and so on. C’s only 
apparent shortcoming (in this network) is the fact that it is not often (asked to be) present in syndicates led 
by the other VCs.  
The five centrality measures used in our study are calculated from the two adjacency matrices, and are 
summarized for the four VCs in the following table: 
 
VC 
Normalized 
degree 
Normalized 
indegree 
Normalized 
outdegree 
Normalized 
eigenvector 
Normalized 
betweenness 
A 66.67% 66.67 33.33 73.92 0.00 
B 66.67 33.33 33.33 73.92 0.00 
C 100.00 33.33 100.00 86.50 66.67 
D 33.33 33.33 0.00 39.86 0.00 
 
Degree counts the number of undirected ties an actor has, by summing the actor’s row (or column) 
vector in the undirected adjacency matrix. In our setting, this is the number of (unique) VCs with which a 
VC has syndicated deals. Thus, A’s degree is 2, B’s is 2, C’s is 3, and D’s is 1. Clearly, degree is a 
function of network size, which in our dataset varies over time. To ensure comparability over time, we 
normalize degree by dividing by the maximum possible degree in an n-actor network. With n=4, a given 
VC can be tied to at most three other unique VCs. This gives normalized degrees of 66.67%, 66.67%, 
100% and 33.33% for A, B, C, and D, respectively. By this measure, C is the most central and D the least 
central VC in the network. 
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Degree does not distinguish between initiating and receiving ties, or in our context, between leading a 
syndicate or simply participating in it. Indegree counts the number of directed ties an actor received, by 
summing the actor’s column vector in the directed adjacency matrix. In our setting, this is the number of 
unique VCs that have led syndicates in which the VC was invited to participate as a non-lead member. 
A’s indegree of 2 (or 66.67% when normalized) is the highest in the network. Outdegree measures the 
number of ties an actor initiates, by summing the actor’s row vector. In our setting, this is the number of 
unique VCs that have participated as (non-lead) members in syndicates led by the VC in question. C’s 
outdegree is 3 (or 100% when normalized), reflecting the fact that C has involved every other VC in its 
syndicates at least once.  
A popular measure of closeness in large networks is eigenvector centrality (Bonacich (1972, 1987)). 
It attempts to find the most central actors in the sense of shortest distance from all other actors (where 
distances are measured as the shortest number of steps required to reach each “friend of a friend of a 
friend...”). It is computed by taking the (scaled) elements of the eigenvector corresponding to the largest 
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. This yields eigenvector centrality measures of 0.523, 0.523, 0.612 
and 0.282 for A, B, C, and D, respectively. These can be normalized by dividing by the maximum 
possible eigenvector element value for a four-actor network, yielding normalized eigenvector centrality 
measures of 73.92%, 73.92%, 86.5% and 39.86% for A, B, C, and D, respectively. 
Finally, betweenness measures the proportion of shortest-distance paths between other actors in the 
network that the actor in question lies upon. Imagine a star-shaped network, with one actor connected to 
all other actors, none of whom is connected to anyone else. Clearly, the actor at the center of the star 
stands “between” all other actors. In our undirected matrix, C occupies such a position with respect to D: 
A can reach B and C directly, but must go through C to reach D; B can reach A and C directly, but must 
also go through C to reach D; and D can reach C directly, but must go through C to reach either of A or B. 
Thus, A, B, and D have zero betweenness while C stands between D and A and between D and B and so 
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has a betweenness measure of 2. The maximum betweenness in a four-actor network is three,26 so the 
normalized betweenness measures are 0% for A, B and D, and 66.67% for C.  
It is clear from the table that C is the most central VC in the network by all measures save indegree. 
This reflects the fact that C is connected to every VC in the network, whereas the other VCs are not, and 
the fact that C is present in almost every syndicate that was formed, and led most of the syndicates. C’s 
relatively low indegree suggests it is not invited to join many deals (though it may also reflect C’s 
tendency to lead deals). C’s high degree and eigenvector centrality measures reflect its central position, or 
importance, in the network. Similarly, C’s high betweenness reflects its potential role as a “broker” in the 
network, in that C is the sole connector between D and the other VCs.  
This example illustrates the importance of considering more than one measure of a VC’s centrality, as 
each captures certain unique elements of the VC’s ties to other VCs. That said, it also provides an 
indication of the fact that despite these differences, these five centrality measures are still likely to be 
highly correlated with each other. 
                                                 
26 To illustrate this, consider the network taking the form of a “Y,” where actors A, C and D sit on the three end points of 
the “Y” and actor B sits at the center. This is the network configuration that provides the highest number of shortest-
distance paths upon which a single actor sits, in this case actor B, who sits upon the shortest-distance paths from A to C, 
from A to D, and from C to D.  
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Figure 1. Mean Exit Rates by Fund Vintage Year 
The fund-level sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 
1999. The figure shows the average exit rate by the year a fund was raised (its vintage year). Exit rates are defined as the 
fraction of a fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to 
another company (M&A), as of November 2003.  
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Figure 2.  
The company-level sample consists of 16,315 portfolio companies that received their first institutional round of funding 
(according to Venture Economics) from a sample VC fund between 1980 and 1999. We track each company through 
November 2003, recording whether it received further funding or exited via an IPO or M&A transaction. The figure shows 
the number of companies over the first five rounds, as well as the number of exits and write-offs. The median company 
receives two funding rounds. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 1999 (the 
“vintage years”). Fund size is the amount of committed capital reported in the Venture Economics database. Sequence 
number denotes whether a fund is the first, second and so forth fund raised by a particular VC management firm. The 
classification into seed or early-stage funds follows Venture Economics’ fund focus variable. Absent data on fund returns, we 
measure a fund’s performance by its exit rate, defined as the fraction of its portfolio companies that have been successfully 
exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of November 2003. We also report dollar 
exit rates, defined as the fraction of the portfolio by invested dollars that has been successfully exited. The four controls for 
the investment experience of a sample fund’s parent (management) firm are based on the parent’s investment activities 
measured between the parent’s creation and the fund’s vintage year. By definition, the experience measures are zero for first-
time funds. The network measures are derived from adjacency matrices constructed using all VC syndicates over the five 
years prior to a sample fund’s vintage year. We view networks as existing among VC management firms, not among VC 
funds, so that a newly-raised fund can benefit from its parent’s pre-existing network connections. A management firm’s 
outdegree is the number of unique VCs that have participated as non-lead investors in syndicates lead-managed by the firm. 
(The lead investor is identified as the fund that invests the largest amount in the portfolio company.) A firm’s indegree is the 
number of unique VCs that have led syndicates the firm was a non-lead member of. A firm’s degree is the number of unique 
VCs it has syndicated with (regardless of syndicate role). Eigenvector measures how close to all other VCs a given VC is. 
Betweenness is the number of shortest-distance paths between other VCs in the network upon which the VC sits. Each 
network measure is normalized by the theoretical maximum (e.g., the degree of a VC who has syndicated with every other 
VC in the network.) The VC inflows variable is the aggregate amount of capital raised by other VC funds in the sample 
fund’s vintage year. P/E and B/M are the price/earnings and book/market ratios of public companies in the sample fund’s 
industry of interest. We take a fund’s industry of interest to be the Venture Economics industry that accounts for the largest 
share of its portfolio, based on dollars invested. Venture Economics classifies portfolio companies into the following six 
industries: biotechnology, communications and media, computer related, medical/health/life science, semiconductors/other 
electronics, and non-high-technology. We map public-market P/E and B/M ratios to these industries based on four-digit SIC 
codes. The ratios are value-weighted averages measured over a sample fund’s first three years of existence, to control for 
investment opportunities during the fund’s most active investment phase.  
 
  
42
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
 No. Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
Fund characteristics       
fund size ($m) 3,105 64.0 169.2 0.1 20.0 5,000 
sequence number 2,242 3.4 3.7 1 2 32 
first fund (fraction, %) 3,469 25.1     
seed or early-stage fund (fraction, %) 3,469 36.5     
Fund performance       
exit rate (% of portfolio companies exited) 3,469 34.2 29.2 0 33.3 100 
    IPO rate (% of portfolio companies sold via IPO) 3,469 20.7 25.1 0 13.6 100 
    M&A rate (% of portfolio companies sold via M&A) 3,469 13.6 18.7 0 8.5 100 
dollar exit rate (% of invested $ exited) 3,411 35.8 32.3 0 30.6 100 
    dollar IPO rate (% of invested $ exited via IPO) 3,411 22.2 28.2 0 10.6 100 
    dollar M&A rate (% of invested $ exited via M&A) 3,411 13.6 20.9 0 5.3 100 
 
Fund parent’s experience (as of vintage year)       
days since parent’s first investment 3,469 1,701 2,218 0 486 9,130 
no. of rounds parent has participated in so far 3,469 76.6 199.4 0 5 2,292 
aggregate amount parent has invested so far ($m) 3,469 71.7 249.6 0 4.9 6,564 
no. of portfolio companies parent has invested in so far 3,469 30.8 65.3 0 4 601 
Network measures (as of vintage year)       
outdegree  3,469 1.203 2.463 0 0.099 22.91
indegree  3,469 1.003 1.671 0 0.210 13.54
degree 3,469 4.237 6.355 0 1.245 41.29
betweenness  3,469 0.285 0.750 0 0.004 7.16
eigenvector 3,469 3.742 5.188 0 1.188 30.96
Competition       
VC inflows in fund’s vintage year ($bn) 3,469 23.842 29.349 2.295 6.474 84.632
Investment opportunities       
average P/E ratio in fund’s first 3 years  3,469 16.4 3.7 8.5 16.1 27.1 
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years 3,469 0.514 0.237 0.177 0.526 1.226
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Table 2. Network Density and Centralization Over Time 
The network characteristics of the VC industry are measured in rolling five-year windows. In each window, we count the number of VC firms that lead-manage a portfolio 
company, the total number of VCs that participate in investment rounds, and the number of investment rounds. For instance, in 1976-1980, 374 VC firms participated in 
1,541 investment rounds, 243 of whom acted one or more times as lead investor. For each window, we construct two matrices. The cells in the “directed” matrix record 
whether VC firm i participated in one or more investment rounds lead-managed by VC firm j. The cells in the “undirected” matrix record whether VC firms i and j co-
invested in one or more portfolio companies (regardless of who was the lead VC). The density of the resulting ties are reported as a proportion of all ties that could be 
present (which increases in network size). Network centralization measures the inequality in the VCs’ network positions. It is computed as the observed variation in the five 
centrality measures defined in Table 1 relative to the variation in the most unequal network (a perfect star) of equivalent size.  
 
     Density of ties (% of theoretical max.)  Network centralization 
 Number of ...  undirected ties directed ties   (% of theoretical max.) 
Estimation 
window 
lead VC 
firms VC firms 
investment 
rounds  mean s.d.  mean s.d.   outdegree indegree 
degree 
centrality 
between-
ness 
eigen-
vectors 
1976-1980 243 374 1,541 3.7 19.0 0.8 9.0  10.5 6.2 25.1 7.7 27.7 
1977-1981 308 496 2,267 3.7 18.8 0.7 8.6  10.8 7.6 29.8 6.4 28.0 
1978-1982 398 638 3,256 3.5 18.4 0.7 8.3  10.8 7.6 30.8 6.9 25.9 
1979-1983 499 807 4,436 3.6 18.7 0.7 8.2  14.1 9.8 34.4 6.4 23.2 
1980-1984 589 952 5,750 3.5 18.4 0.7 8.1  15.8 10.3 36.1 6.4 20.3 
1981-1985 654 1,061 6,876 3.5 18.3 0.7 8.0  16.4 10.8 37.7 6.6 19.2 
1982-1986 714 1,115 7,805 4.1 19.9 0.7 8.3  16.1 11.8 37.8 6.8 18.5 
1983-1987 703 1,092 8,702 4.0 19.6 0.8 8.8  17.5 12.9 37.5 6.4 17.5 
1984-1988 690 1,057 9,117 4.1 19.9 0.8 9.1  17.5 12.7 35.8 5.7 16.5 
1985-1989 653 1,007 9,387 4.2 20.0 0.9 9.4  16.4 12.2 36.2 4.8 16.5 
1986-1990 622 927 9,517 4.5 20.6 1.0 9.8  16.0 11.8 33.3 5.1 16.9 
1987-1991 558 847 9,206 4.5 20.7 1.0 9.9  18.9 9.7 33.1 4.1 16.7 
1988-1992 527 788 8,965 4.4 20.4 1.0 10.0  21.6 10.7 33.7 4.7 17.8 
1989-1993 495 730 8,561 4.2 20.0 1.0 9.9  21.9 11.1 34.1 5.5 18.8 
1990-1994 468 696 8,147 3.9 19.3 1.0 9.7  21.0 10.6 33.4 6.4 20.7 
1991-1995 551 815 8,342 2.8 16.5 0.7 8.3  17.8 9.8 30.6 6.7 22.4 
1992-1996 700 965 9,656 2.2 14.7 0.6 7.4  14.4 8.9 26.3 7.2 23.7 
1993-1997 869 1,134 11,324 1.8 13.4 0.5 6.8  13.1 8.2 23.9 6.1 23.2 
1994-1998 1,098 1,375 14,087 1.5 12.2 0.4 6.2  11.7 7.0 20.4 6.0 23.1 
1995-1999 1,405 1,812 18,093 1.4 11.6 0.3 5.7  10.9 6.6 19.0 4.3 21.8 
1996-2000 1,842 2,325 24,381 1.2 11.1 0.3 5.4  10.5 6.7 21.7 3.7 19.1 
1997-2001 1,966 2,483 26,551 1.2 11.0 0.3 5.4  10.4 7.2 22.9 4.5 18.5 
1998-2002 2,009 2,580 26,727 1.2 10.8 0.3 5.3  10.3 7.1 23.8 4.9 18.9 
1999-2003 1,927 2,518 25,228 1.2 11.0 0.3 5.3  10.3 7.0 24.1 5.9 19.2 
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Table 3. Benchmark Determinants of Fund Performance  
The sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 1999. The 
dependent variable is a fund’s exit rate, defined as the fraction of a fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully 
exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of November 2003. Exit rates average 
34.2% in the overall sample of 3,469 funds, and 34.5% in the estimation sample of 3,105 funds for which all required data 
are available. All results in this and the following tables are robust to computing exit rates using the fraction of invested 
dollars that are successfully exited instead. Sequence number denotes whether a fund is the first, second and so forth fund 
raised by a particular VC management firm. Sequence numbers are missing in Venture Economics for a third of the funds. 
The classification into seed or early-stage funds follows Venture Economics’ fund focus variable. The VC inflows variable is 
the aggregate amount of capital raised by other VC funds in the year the sample fund was raised (its vintage year). P/E and 
B/M are the price/earnings and book/market ratios of public companies in the sample fund’s industry of interest. We take a 
fund’s industry of interest to be the Venture Economics industry that accounts for the largest share of the fund’s portfolio, 
based on dollars invested. Venture Economics classifies portfolio companies into the following six industries: biotechnology, 
communications and media, computer related, medical/health/life science, semiconductors/other electronics, and non-high-
technology. We map public-market P/E and B/M ratios to these industries based on four-digit SIC codes. The ratios are 
value-weighted averages measured over a sample fund’s first three years of existence, to control for investment opportunities 
during the fund’s most active investment phase. All models are estimated using ordinary least-squares. Year dummies 
controlling for vintage year effects are included but not reported. They are jointly significant but their exclusion does not 
affect our results. Intercepts are not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. (Results 
are robust to clustering the standard errors on firm id instead.) We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Fund characteristics         
ln fund size 0.024  0.038*** 0.046*** 0.046***  0.043*** 0.039***
 0.016  0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011 0.011 
ln fund size squared -0.001  -0.003* -0.004** -0.004**  -0.004** -0.003** 
 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.0015 
ln sequence number 0.017 0.026*       
 0.016 0.016       
ln sequence number squared 0.004 0.003       
 0.007 0.007       
=1 if first fund    -0.036*** -0.036***  -0.037*** -0.038***
    0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
=1 if seed or early-stage fund    -0.006 -0.006  -0.009 -0.021** 
    0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
Competition         
ln VC inflows in fund’s vintage year     -0.063***  -0.065*** -0.110***
     0.008  0.008 0.009 
Investment opportunities         
average P/E ratio in fund’s first 3 years        0.008***  
       0.002  
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years        -0.325***
        0.030 
Diagnostics         
Adjusted R2 21.7 % 20.7 % 13.6 % 13.9 % 13.9 %  14.7 % 17.1 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 36.2*** 35.3*** 39.5*** 36.4*** 36.4***  36.1*** 41.5*** 
No. of observations 2,242 2,283 3,105 3,105 3,105  3,105 3,105 
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Table 4. The Effect of Firm Experience on Fund Performance 
The sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 1999. The 
dependent variable is a fund’s exit rate, defined as the fraction of a fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully 
exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of November 2003. The first six variables 
are defined as in Table 3. In addition, we include controls for the investment experience of a sample fund’s parent 
(management) firm. These are based on the parent’s investment activities measured between the parent’s creation and the 
fund’s creation. Investment activities are controlled as the parent’s age (days since its first investment), number of rounds 
participated in, aggregate dollars invested, and number of portfolio companies invested in. By definition, these four measures 
are zero for first-time funds. The experience measures are highly correlated among each other, so we include them one at a 
time. All models are estimated using ordinary least-squares. Year dummies controlling for vintage year effects are included 
but not reported. They are jointly significant but their exclusion does not affect our results. Intercepts are not shown. White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. (Results are robust to clustering the standard errors on firm 
id instead.) We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Fund characteristics      
ln fund size 0.035*** 0.030***  0.030*** 0.030***
 0.011 0.011  0.011 0.011 
ln fund size squared -0.003** -0.003**  -0.003** -0.003** 
 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
=1 if first fund 0.003 -0.001  0.007 -0.003 
 0.011 0.012  0.011 0.012 
=1 if seed or early-stage fund -0.025*** -0.026***  -0.024** -0.025** 
 0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
Competition      
ln VC inflows in fund’s vintage year -0.109*** -0.111***  -0.114*** -0.111***
 0.009 0.009  0.009 0.009 
Investment opportunities      
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years -0.318*** -0.319***  -0.317*** -0.319***
 0.030 0.030  0.030 0.030 
Fund parent’s experience      
ln days since parent’s first investment 0.015***     
 0.002     
ln no. of rounds parent has participated in so far  0.017***    
  0.003    
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far    0.012***  
    0.002  
ln no. of portfolio companies parent has invested in so far     0.020***
     0.004 
Diagnostics      
Adjusted R2 18.4 % 18.0 %  18.8 % 18.0 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 44.2*** 42.7***  44.3*** 42.5*** 
No. of observations 3,105 3,105  3,105 3,105 
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Table 5. The Effect of Firm Networks on Fund Performance 
The sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 1999. The 
dependent variable is a fund’s exit rate, defined as the fraction of a fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully 
exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of November 2003. The first six variables 
are defined as in Table 3. The experience measures considered in Table 4 are highly correlated among each other. To avoid 
collinearity problems, we include only one in this table, aggregate dollars invested. This variable has the largest economic 
effect in Table 3. All our results are robust to choosing any of the other experience measures instead. In addition, we control 
for the effect of the parent’s networkedness on a sample fund’s performance. The five network measures are defined in Table 
1; they are normalized by their respective theoretical maximum (e.g., the degree of a VC who has syndicated with every other 
VC in the network.). All models are estimated using ordinary least-squares. Year dummies controlling for vintage year 
effects are included but not reported. They are jointly significant but their exclusion does not affect our results. Intercepts are 
not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. (Results are robust to clustering the 
standard errors on firm id instead, except that betweenness ceases to be significant at conventional levels.) We use ***, **, and 
* to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Fund characteristics       
ln fund size 0.029*** 0.028** 0.027**  0.029*** 0.028** 
 0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011 0.011 
ln fund size squared -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**  -0.003** -0.003** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
=1 if first fund 0.008 0.011 0.010  0.007 0.011 
 0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011 0.011 
=1 if seed or early-stage fund -0.024** -0.026*** -0.024**  -0.024** -0.024** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
Competition       
ln VC inflows in fund’s vintage year -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.107***  -0.111*** -0.105***
 0.009 0.009 0.009  0.009 0.009 
Investment opportunities       
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years -0.313*** -0.310*** -0.309***  -0.314*** -0.306***
 0.030 0.030 0.030  0.030 0.030 
Fund parent's experience       
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008***  0.011*** 0.008***
 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
Network measures       
outdegree  0.006***      
 0.002      
indegree  0.013***     
  0.003     
degree   0.003***    
   0.001    
betweenness      0.013**  
     0.006  
eigenvector      0.004***
      0.001 
Diagnostics       
Adjusted R2 18.9 % 19.1 % 19.1 %  18.8 % 19.1 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 43.4*** 44.3*** 44.1***  42.8*** 44.1*** 
No. of observations 3,105 3,105 3,105  3,105 3,105 
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Table 6. Performance Persistence 
The sample consists of 1,293 second- or higher sequence number venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were 
started between 1980 and 1999. The dependent variable is a fund’s exit rate, defined as the fraction of a fund’s portfolio 
companies that have been successfully exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of 
November 2003. All variables are defined as in Table 5, except lagged exit rate, which is the exit rate of the VC parent firm’s 
most recent past fund. We include lagged exit rate to control for persistence in VC performance. The five network measures 
are defined in Table 1; they are normalized by their respective theoretical maximum (e.g., the degree of a VC who has 
syndicated with every other VC in the network.). All models are estimated using ordinary least-squares. Year dummies 
controlling for vintage year effects are included but not reported. They are jointly significant but their exclusion does not 
affect our results. Intercepts are not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. (Results 
are robust to clustering the standard errors on firm id instead.) We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Fund characteristics       
ln fund size 0.021 0.020 0.020  0.021 0.021 
 0.018 0.018 0.018  0.018 0.018 
ln fund size squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 -0.002 
 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
=1 if seed or early-stage fund -0.013 -0.015 -0.013  -0.013 -0.013 
 0.013 0.013 0.013  0.013 0.013 
Competition       
ln VC inflows in fund’s vintage year -0.104*** -0.100*** -0.100***  -0.103*** -0.096***
 0.016 0.017 0.017  0.016 0.017 
Investment opportunities       
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years -0.253*** -0.247*** -0.247***  -0.253*** -0.242***
 0.046 0.046 0.046  0.046 0.046 
Fund parent's experience       
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far 0.008* 0.005 0.006  0.008** 0.005 
 0.004 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.004 
Fund parent's lagged performance       
lagged exit rate 0.262*** 0.256*** 0.258***  0.263*** 0.255***
 0.032 0.032 0.032  0.031 0.032 
Network measures       
outdegree  0.003      
 0.003      
indegree  0.012***     
  0.004     
degree   0.003**    
   0.001    
betweenness      0.013  
     0.009  
eigenvector      0.004** 
      0.002 
Diagnostics       
Adjusted R2 30.4 % 30.8 % 30.6 %  30.4 % 30.6 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 30.6*** 31.1*** 30.7***  30.2*** 30.8*** 
No. of observations 1,293 1,293 1,293  1,293 1,293 
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Table 7. Determinants of Portfolio Company Survival  
The sample consists of up to 13,761 portfolio companies that received their first institutional round of funding from a sample VC fund between 1980 and 1999 (and for 
which relevant cross-sectional information is available). We track each company from its first funding round across all rounds to the date of its exit or November 2003, 
whichever is sooner. The dependent variable is an indicator equaling one if the company survived from round N to round N+1 or if it exited via an IPO or M&A transaction. 
Note that survival to round N+1 is conditional on having survived to round N, so the sample size decreases from round to round. All independent variables are defined as in 
Tables 3-5. The four measures of the parent’s investment experience are measured from the date of the parent’s creation to the end of the year in which the funding round is 
concluded. All models are estimated using probit MLE. Industry effects using the Venture Economics industry groups are included but not reported. Intercepts are not 
shown. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Survived round Survived round  Survived round Survived round 
 1  2 3 1 2 3  1 2 3 1 2 3 
Fund characteristics               
ln fund size 0.248***  0.196*** 0.161*** 0.227*** 0.182*** 0.159***  0.217*** 0.184*** 0.166*** 0.254*** 0.192*** 0.166*** 
 0.030  0.044 0.056 0.031 0.044 0.056  0.031 0.044 0.056 0.031 0.044 0.056 
ln fund size squared -0.009**  -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.008** -0.015*** -0.019***  -0.009** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.009** -0.015*** -0.019*** 
 0.004  0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006  0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 
=1 if first fund -0.058**  -0.076** -0.166*** -0.016 -0.040 -0.152***  -0.011 -0.046 -0.174*** -0.046* -0.059 -0.166*** 
 0.026  0.036 0.044 0.026 0.036 0.044  0.025 0.036 0.043 0.026 0.036 0.044 
Competition               
ln VC inflows in funding year -0.163***  -0.203*** -0.161*** -0.156*** -0.196*** -0.160***  -0.161*** -0.204*** -0.156*** -0.164*** -0.200*** -0.161*** 
 0.020  0.021 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.025  0.020 0.021 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Investment opportunities               
mean B/M ratio in funding year -0.489***  -0.993*** -0.742*** -0.415*** -0.944*** -0.720***  -0.400*** -0.945*** -0.749*** -0.467*** -0.967*** -0.728*** 
 0.114  0.154 0.202 0.114 0.153 0.201  0.114 0.153 0.200 0.113 0.153 0.191 
Fund parent's experience               
ln days  -0.043***  -0.021 -0.022           
 0.013  0.021 0.025           
ln no. of rounds      0.022** 0.029** 0.001        
     0.009 0.013 0.016        
ln aggregate $ amount invested         0.029*** 0.025* -0.031*    
         0.008 0.014 0.018    
ln no. of portfolio companies             -0.025** 0.009 -0.022 
            0.012 0.017 0.020 
Diagnostics                
Pseudo R2 9.1 %  4.2 % 2.4 % 9.1% 4.2 % 2.3 %  9.1 % 4.2 % 2.4 % 9.1 % 4.2 % 2.4 % 
Test: all coeff. = 0 (F) 1495.8***  352.7*** 128.7*** 1488.2*** 356.5*** 128.8***  1493.2*** 353.7*** 132.4*** 1488.1*** 352.3*** 144.5*** 
No. of observations 13,761  8,650 6,164 13,761 8,650 6,164  13,761 8,650 6,164 13,761 8,650 6,164 
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Table 8. Panel A. Effect of Firm Networks on Portfolio Company Survival  
The sample consists of up to 13,761 portfolio companies that received their first institutional round of funding from a sample VC fund between 1980 and 1999 (and for 
which relevant cross-sectional information is available). We track each company from its first funding round across all rounds to the date of its exit or November 2003, 
whichever is sooner. The dependent variable is an indicator equaling one if the company survived from round N to round N+1 or if it exited via an IPO or M&A transaction. 
Note that survival to round N+1 is conditional on having survived to round N, so the sample size decreases from round to round. All independent variables are defined as in 
Tables 3-6. The measures of the parent’s networkedness are estimated over the five-year window ending in the year the funding round is concluded. All models are 
estimated using probit MLE. Industry effects using the Venture Economics industry groups are included but not reported. Intercepts are not shown. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Survived round  Survived round  Survived round 
 1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Fund characteristics           
ln fund size 0.217*** 0.159*** 0.098* 0.204*** 0.141*** 0.074 0.206*** 0.147*** 0.079  
 0.030 0.044 0.058 0.030 0.044 0.058 0.030 0.044 0.059  
ln fund size squared -0.009** -0.012** -0.007 -0.007 -0.009* -0.003 -0.007* -0.010* -0.004  
 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007  
=1 if first fund -0.003 -0.039 -0.162*** -0.002 -0.036 -0.158*** -0.007 -0.040 -0.162***  
 0.025 0.036 0.044 0.026 0.036 0.044 0.025 0.036 0.044  
Competition           
ln VC inflows in funding year -0.125*** -0.156*** -0.080*** -0.123*** -0.160*** -0.089*** -0.121*** -0.158*** -0.075***  
 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.021 0.023 0.027  
Investment opportunities           
mean B/M ratio in funding year -0.452*** -1.058*** -1.035*** -0.440*** -1.033*** -0.929*** -0.451*** -1.085*** -1.093***  
 0.114 0.153 0.197 0.114 0.152 0.196 0.114 0.154 0.196  
Fund parent's experience           
ln aggregate $ amount invested -0.009 -0.040** -0.146*** -0.010 -0.032* -0.125*** -0.008 -0.030* -0.136***  
 0.010 0.017 0.024 0.010 0.017 0.023 0.010 0.018 0.024  
Network measures           
outdegree  0.035*** 0.044*** 0.076***        
 0.005 0.007 0.009        
indegree    0.057*** 0.064*** 0.101***     
    0.008 0.011 0.014     
degree       0.014*** 0.017*** 0.032***  
       0.002 0.003 0.004  
Diagnostics            
Pseudo R2 9.5% 4.7 % 4.0 % 9.5 % 4.7 % 3.6 % 9.4 % 4.6 % 3.7 %  
Test: all coeff. = 0 (F) 1509.9*** 386.0 *** 203.3*** 1513.7*** 380.1*** 195.3*** 1511.5*** 378.2*** 205.1***  
No. of observations 13,761 8,650 6,164 13,761 8,650 6,164 13,761 8,650 6,164  
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Table 8. Panel B. Effect of Firm Networks on Portfolio Company Survival 
 
 Survived round  Survived round 
 1 2 3  1  2 3 
Fund characteristics        
ln fund size 0.220*** 0.177*** 0.142*** 0.204***  0.134*** 0.086 
 0.031 0.044 0.056 0.030  0.044 0.059 
ln fund size squared -0.009** -0.014*** -0.013* -0.007*  -0.008 -0.005 
 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004  0.005 0.007 
=1 if first fund -0.013 -0.051 -0.183*** -0.005  -0.034 -0.157***
 0.025 0.036 0.044 0.026  0.036 0.044 
Competition        
ln VC inflows in funding year -0.155*** -0.185*** -0.122*** -0.135***  -0.155*** -0.089***
 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.021  0.022 0.026 
Investment opportunities        
mean B/M ratio in funding year -0.453*** -0.994*** -0.782*** -0.568***  -1.105*** -0.899***
 0.115 0.153 0.198 0.115  0.153 0.198 
Fund parent's experience        
ln aggregate $ amount invested 0.015* -0.008 -0.087*** -0.026***  -0.066*** -0.158***
 0.009 0.016 0.021 0.010  0.018 0.024 
Network measures        
betweenness  0.052*** 0.093*** 0.151***     
 0.015 0.021 0.026     
eigenvector    0.027***  0.036*** 0.049***
    0.003  0.004 0.005 
Diagnostics         
Pseudo R2 9.2 % 4.5 % 3.1 % 9.7 %  5.1 % 4.0 % 
Test: all coeff. = 0 (F) 1497.9*** 371.0*** 170.9*** 1554.1***  426.8*** 236.7*** 
No. of observations 13,761 8,650 6,164 13,761  8,650 6,164 
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Table 9. Pooled Portfolio Company Survival Models  
The sample pools 42,074 funding rounds for 13,761 portfolio companies that were concluded from 1980 onwards. We track 
each company from its first funding round across all rounds to the date of its exit or November 2003, whichever is sooner. In 
this panel structure, the dependent variable is an indicator equaling one in round N if the company survived to the next round 
N+1. Unless it subsequently exited via an IPO or M&A transaction, the dependent variable is zero in the company’s last 
recorded round. All models are estimated using panel probit estimators with random company effects. All independent 
variables are defined as in Tables 3 through 8. The measures of the parent’s investment experience and networkedness are 
estimated as of the year in which the funding round is concluded. Industry effects using the Venture Economics industry 
groups are included but not reported. Intercepts are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Fund characteristics       
ln fund size 0.274*** 0.250*** 0.247***  0.298*** 0.256*** 
 0.021 0.021 0.021  0.021 0.021 
ln fund size squared -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.020***  -0.028*** -0.022*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.003 0.003 
=1 if first fund -0.021 -0.021 -0.025  -0.040** -0.020 
 0.018 0.018 0.018  0.018 0.018 
Competition       
ln VC inflows in funding year -0.019* -0.019* -0.004  -0.049*** -0.023** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
Investment opportunities       
mean B/M ratio in funding year -0.517*** -0.482*** -0.589***  -0.404*** -0.566*** 
 0.070 0.070 0.071  0.070 0.071 
Fund parent's experience       
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.075***  -0.025*** -0.091*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007  0.007 0.008 
Network measures       
outdegree  0.057***      
 0.003      
indegree  0.086***     
  0.005     
degree   0.028***    
   0.001    
betweenness      0.107***  
     0.009  
eigenvector      0.045*** 
      0.002 
Diagnostics       
Pseudo R2 5.6 % 5.6 % 5.7 %  5.1 % 5.9 % 
Test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2) 1899.1*** 1892.2*** 1918.6***  1705.2*** 1961.7*** 
No. of observations 42,074 42,074 42,074  42,074 42,074 
No. of companies 13,761 13,761 13,761  13,761 13,761 
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Table 10. Effect of Network Position on Portfolio Company Exit Duration 
The sample consists of 13,761 portfolio companies that received their first institutional round of funding (according to 
Venture Economics) from a sample VC fund between 1980 and 1999 (and for which relevant cross-sectional information is 
available). We estimate accelerated time-to-exit models (i.e., hazard models written with log time as the dependent variable) 
where log time is assumed to be normally distributed. (We obtain similar results using other distributions, such as the 
exponential, Gompertz, and Weibull. Our results are also robust to estimating semi-parametric Cox models.) Positive 
(negative) coefficients indicate that the covariate increases (decreases) the time a company takes to exit via an IPO or an 
M&A transaction. Companies that have not exited by the fund’s tenth anniversary are assumed to have been liquidated. 
Companies backed by funds that are in existence beyond November 2003 are treated as right-censored (to allow for the 
possibility that they may yet exit successfully after the end of our sample period), and the likelihood function is modified 
accordingly. The models allow for time-varying covariates. We treat market conditions as time-varying, that is, market 
conditions change every quarter between the first investment round and the final exit (or the fund’s tenth anniversary, or 
November 2003). All other independent variables are treated as time-invariant; they are defined as in Tables 3 through 9. The 
measures of the parent’s investment experience and network centrality are estimated as of the year in which the portfolio 
company received its first funding round. Intercepts are not shown. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown 
in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
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Table 10. Effect of Network Position on Portfolio Company Exit Duration (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Fund characteristics       
ln fund size 0.029 0.033 0.033  0.024 0.042 
 0.038 0.038 0.038  0.038 0.038 
ln fund size squared 0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 -0.002 
 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.005 0.005 
=1 if first fund -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.156***  -0.152*** -0.160***
 0.030 0.030 0.030  0.030 0.030 
Competition       
ln VC inflows in funding year 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.188***  0.198*** 0.184*** 
 0.026 0.026 0.026  0.025 0.025 
Investment opportunities       
mean B/M ratio in funding year 1.402*** 1.395*** 1.403***  1.408*** 1.388*** 
 0.078 0.078 0.078  0.078 0.078 
Fund parent's experience       
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.097***  -0.100*** -0.080***
 0.013 0.013 0.014  0.012 0.013 
Market conditions (time-varying)       
lagged NASDAQ Composite Index return  -0.719*** -0.718*** -0.718***  -0.718*** -0.718***
 0.085 0.085 0.085  0.085 0.085 
lagged ln no. of VC-backed IPOs in same VE industry -0.271*** -0.271*** -0.271***  -0.271*** -0.271***
 0.014 0.014 0.014  0.014 0.014 
lagged ln no. of VC-backed M&A deals in same VE industry 0.019 0.021 0.019  0.019 0.014 
 0.016 0.016 0.016  0.016 0.016 
Network measures       
outdegree  -0.011**      
 0.005      
indegree  -0.018**     
  0.007     
degree   -0.005**    
   0.002    
betweenness      -0.035***  
     0.013  
eigenvector      -0.014***
      0.003 
Diagnostics       
Pseudo R2 8.3 % 8.3 % 8.3 %  8.3 % 8.4 % 
Test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2) 991.0*** 999.8*** 990.1***  994.1*** 1039.5*** 
No. of observations 13,761 13,761 13,761  13,761 13,761 
 
